Check out my new Blog. Mostly because, it is a revamped, more sophisticated version of my thoughts.
Also because, I didn't actually think people visited the website until I looked at the stats!
http://tandooricasadia.blogspot.com/
Wednesday, October 19, 2011
Sunday, September 26, 2010
defining you
How did your identity arise? Where did this definition originate, from the mind or the polis? Why take pains to distinguish oneself as an individual, separated from generality? Why would one one consider abandoning the cave when the intricacies of life seem to simply green, brown, crumble and blow away?
Wednesday, August 4, 2010
Elections
Our society is designed such that the farthest and most long term solutions it comes up with lasts until the next election...
Saturday, April 3, 2010
What is art?
Imagine art as a doorway, or a means by which connections can be made between the mind and the external world. Through transposing these worlds, one can expand and clarify the perceptions of ones environment, beyond just rationality -- which is more about understanding, with a more holistic approach. The external world includes ones place within nature, our subconsciousness, our responses, our emotions, in relation to our minds and the minds of others. The degree to which this art can be considered good is basically the ease by which this door can be opened, how far it lets us see and how deep it lets us go.
[my] spirituality
spirituality is standing on top of a mountain and looking out.
its observing the sky and watching the clouds and stars that inhabit them.
its a feeling of awe and wonder.
its realizing that you are just a person on top of a planet in the middle of nowhere.
its listening to Carl Sagan.
its the moment before curiosity and the moment after one realizes their ignorance.
its observing the sky and watching the clouds and stars that inhabit them.
its a feeling of awe and wonder.
its realizing that you are just a person on top of a planet in the middle of nowhere.
its listening to Carl Sagan.
its the moment before curiosity and the moment after one realizes their ignorance.
Saturday, December 12, 2009
Rawls versus Liberalism: Does Rawls Contribute or Subtract from Liberal Philosophy?
The philosophy of liberalism is one with a rich and profound history even before it was first authored by early enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke with manuscripts like the Magna Carta and even the Cyrus Cylinder. Yet, only recently has this philosophy been radically enhanced with the introduction of the revolutionary ideas of John Rawls. Instead of a starting from a state of nature where individuals create states in order to protect their life, liberty and property, Rawls asks what the best society would be, for reasonable people, if they did not know who they were going to become before coming into existence; this conception is otherwise known as the veil of ignorance [hereby known as veil] (31). From this, Rawls constructs what he terms as the society of peoples (3) which is composed of accountable, human rights oriented, democratic states which maintain freedom and equality (24). However, unlike the older, more conventional definition of a state (i.e. Webers’ violent monopoly within a given domain), this new type of state does not have the traditional powers of sovereignty which states are usually assumed to have (25). These new states have been termed peoples as they have moral natures, are united by the common sympathies of their individuals, serve the fundamental needs of their citizens [through an accountable democratic arrangement], and adhere to the law of peoples as outlined by reasonable people behind the veil (23). Yet, Rawls’ theory which uses peoples, rather than individuals or citizens, as the moral actors within society (17) has led some to question Rawls’ liberalism (i.e. why not the laws of individuals?). This essay will analyze these claims and compare Rawls’ ideas with the ideas of liberalism to conclude whether or not the law of peoples and liberal philosophy are indeed compatible. After an assessment of Rawls’ criticisms, a thorough examination of the evolution of liberalism and an analysis on the intentions and implications of Rawls’ theory, this essay will attempt to prove that Rawls’ theory is indeed mutually inclusive and compatible with liberal philosophy as a whole.
Rawls’ utopia does, indeed, limit individualism by justifying the use of force in some cases (26). Although Rawls acknowledges and respects them (36), he explicitly denies the individuality and ultimately marginalizes individuals behind the veil who have different capabilities and styles of reasoning (i.e. those who do not come to Rawls’ conclusion) by labeling them as non-rational, merely ‘decent’ or something analogous. Moreover, a right to independence or self determination, a crucial aspect of individualism and autonomy, is limited to whether the action is deemed to be socially just by those behind the veil (38). However, not only is this type of social justice left undefined, but the only example we are given does not have a historically accurate representation of why their potential succession was unjust (i.e. Rawls’ reasoning for the illegitimacy of the south’s right to succeed was a result of the injustices of slavery but many historians suppose that there were other, more important reasons for the increased interest in succession). In reality, if a group sees itself to be marginalized and is interested in succession, it will definitely have no incentive to ask the polis, or consult those behind the veil, whether their actions would be consistent with social justice; rather, they would find their own justifications and act as they deem fit. Most strikingly, although their nature does not change, the motives of individuals certainly changes once they escape the veil. Thus, it becomes increasingly difficult to answer why individuals would act in accordance with Rawls’ theory especially with the problems stated above [heterogeneous rationalities] or if they gain the power of elected officials. Presumably they are indecent, irrational or unjust but if so, they would not care as that is how their nature (maximize resources, minimize risks), the same nature which compelled them to the social compact behind the veil (7), compels them to operate outside the veil; one cannot homogenize individuals within and outside the veil. Also, even though peoples do not hold the same powers of sovereignty of states, peoples still have the right to limit an individual’s right to mobility/immigration within their territory (39). Furthermore, Rawls’ conceptions view the natural abilities of individuals to be a collective asset [rather than owned by the individual] for which society has the right and duty to utilize but this obviously infringes on the individual liberties of some for various subjective principles of collective justice or social equality. Yet still, we must recognize that the philosophy of liberalism holds equality to be just as important as individualism and accusing Rawls’ theory to be illiberal by only focusing on one aspect would be an incomplete assertion.
Over the last century in the United States, historical events shaped liberalism to include positive rights (i.e. equalities - e.g. job, education, welfare, etc.) to the older, constitutional negative rights (i.e. freedoms - e.g. life, property, speech, etc.). This came with the constitutional reforms of Woodrow Wilson, the economic reforms of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 60’s reform protests (e.g. sexual/drug revolution, war remonstrations etc.). Wilson’s constitutional reforms were part of a progressive movement away from the 18th century document and onto a living constitution as the fixed nature of the old constitution meant that self-interest was encouraged and rights were also fixed. Roosevelt’s new deal argued that having freedom of speech meant nothing to a starving man. And finally, the 60’s movements were a result of the new freedoms that could be enjoyed as a result of the necessities provided by the state; it was a move away from the traditional responsibilities (i.e. self-reliance) that were needed in order to enjoy freedom in the previous era. Initially, these new rights were meant for individuals but it had become increasingly important to protect people’s identities as it was defined by an individual’s group (e.g. gay and women rights, racial equality, workers etc.) rather than individuals themselves. Thus, liberalism had grown from an individualist philosophy of negative rights and freedoms to a more collectivist ideology and a new type of duty-filled freedom; meaning that, although the freedom to pursue passions had grown as the state could provide for necessities, paying for these new freedoms resulted in a duty with a higher tax burden. These new collective rights were a subset of the older, individual rights and consequently, a new type of liberalism had emerged from the old Lockean conception of liberalism. Rawls’ theory not only fits, but may even legitimize these reforms. Therefore, although it can be understood that the above criticisms against Rawls are those that encompass the older conceptions of liberalism and not liberalism as it stands today, it can also be argued that Rawls’ theory of peoples, which includes the principles of justice – liberty (i.e. an equal right to pursue happiness compatible with the liberty of others) and the difference principles (i.e. social/economic disparities only to the extent that it helps the worst-off in society) (14), beautifully amalgamates the two pillars of liberalism, freedom and equality, formed within a democratic society. As a result, using the notion of peoples rather than individuals/citizens does not jeopardize Rawls’ liberalism; rather, it advances it since there is an inherent progressivism within liberal philosophy itself.
Nevertheless, Rawls still needs to further his commitment to individualism to truly encompass liberal philosophy. In order for individuals to preserve their liberties and be functional members of a liberal society (i.e. ability to participate and run for office), they need to have equal access, meaning that “fair background social conditions” are necessary; this can be maintained through education and “eliminating unjust discrimination” (115). In much the same manner, liberal peoples also have a duty to help, through institutional establishment, what Rawls terms, burdened societies, which do not have the institutional/political capabilities/framework to help themselves (106) as they are fundamentally interested in a liberal conception of justice (33). Yet, in both cases, as long as the disparity is to the advantage of the least favored, there is no duty to lower income gaps (114). Also, the difference principle is excluded from the church and family (158). Thus, just as liberalism is supposedly a politics of liberation, the goal here is to create a society which maintains equal liberties for all.
Conclusively, it is understandable how Rawls would like his readers to be focused on the just distribution, not the denial, of liberties. Moreover, Rawls’ theory conceptualizes the evolution of liberalism in the United States and skillfully tries to find and maintain the equilibrium between the two supposedly divergent notions. Consequently, he not only skillfully amalgamates freedom and equality, but also individualism and collectivism; justifying all the anti-individualist policies above and achieving what is arguably the core motive for liberal philosophy. Ultimately, this amalgamation is a significant complement to liberalism as it in enhances its progressivism and fruition.
All Works Cited From: John, Rawls, The Law of Peoples. New York: Harvard University Press, 2001. Print.
Rawls’ utopia does, indeed, limit individualism by justifying the use of force in some cases (26). Although Rawls acknowledges and respects them (36), he explicitly denies the individuality and ultimately marginalizes individuals behind the veil who have different capabilities and styles of reasoning (i.e. those who do not come to Rawls’ conclusion) by labeling them as non-rational, merely ‘decent’ or something analogous. Moreover, a right to independence or self determination, a crucial aspect of individualism and autonomy, is limited to whether the action is deemed to be socially just by those behind the veil (38). However, not only is this type of social justice left undefined, but the only example we are given does not have a historically accurate representation of why their potential succession was unjust (i.e. Rawls’ reasoning for the illegitimacy of the south’s right to succeed was a result of the injustices of slavery but many historians suppose that there were other, more important reasons for the increased interest in succession). In reality, if a group sees itself to be marginalized and is interested in succession, it will definitely have no incentive to ask the polis, or consult those behind the veil, whether their actions would be consistent with social justice; rather, they would find their own justifications and act as they deem fit. Most strikingly, although their nature does not change, the motives of individuals certainly changes once they escape the veil. Thus, it becomes increasingly difficult to answer why individuals would act in accordance with Rawls’ theory especially with the problems stated above [heterogeneous rationalities] or if they gain the power of elected officials. Presumably they are indecent, irrational or unjust but if so, they would not care as that is how their nature (maximize resources, minimize risks), the same nature which compelled them to the social compact behind the veil (7), compels them to operate outside the veil; one cannot homogenize individuals within and outside the veil. Also, even though peoples do not hold the same powers of sovereignty of states, peoples still have the right to limit an individual’s right to mobility/immigration within their territory (39). Furthermore, Rawls’ conceptions view the natural abilities of individuals to be a collective asset [rather than owned by the individual] for which society has the right and duty to utilize but this obviously infringes on the individual liberties of some for various subjective principles of collective justice or social equality. Yet still, we must recognize that the philosophy of liberalism holds equality to be just as important as individualism and accusing Rawls’ theory to be illiberal by only focusing on one aspect would be an incomplete assertion.
Over the last century in the United States, historical events shaped liberalism to include positive rights (i.e. equalities - e.g. job, education, welfare, etc.) to the older, constitutional negative rights (i.e. freedoms - e.g. life, property, speech, etc.). This came with the constitutional reforms of Woodrow Wilson, the economic reforms of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 60’s reform protests (e.g. sexual/drug revolution, war remonstrations etc.). Wilson’s constitutional reforms were part of a progressive movement away from the 18th century document and onto a living constitution as the fixed nature of the old constitution meant that self-interest was encouraged and rights were also fixed. Roosevelt’s new deal argued that having freedom of speech meant nothing to a starving man. And finally, the 60’s movements were a result of the new freedoms that could be enjoyed as a result of the necessities provided by the state; it was a move away from the traditional responsibilities (i.e. self-reliance) that were needed in order to enjoy freedom in the previous era. Initially, these new rights were meant for individuals but it had become increasingly important to protect people’s identities as it was defined by an individual’s group (e.g. gay and women rights, racial equality, workers etc.) rather than individuals themselves. Thus, liberalism had grown from an individualist philosophy of negative rights and freedoms to a more collectivist ideology and a new type of duty-filled freedom; meaning that, although the freedom to pursue passions had grown as the state could provide for necessities, paying for these new freedoms resulted in a duty with a higher tax burden. These new collective rights were a subset of the older, individual rights and consequently, a new type of liberalism had emerged from the old Lockean conception of liberalism. Rawls’ theory not only fits, but may even legitimize these reforms. Therefore, although it can be understood that the above criticisms against Rawls are those that encompass the older conceptions of liberalism and not liberalism as it stands today, it can also be argued that Rawls’ theory of peoples, which includes the principles of justice – liberty (i.e. an equal right to pursue happiness compatible with the liberty of others) and the difference principles (i.e. social/economic disparities only to the extent that it helps the worst-off in society) (14), beautifully amalgamates the two pillars of liberalism, freedom and equality, formed within a democratic society. As a result, using the notion of peoples rather than individuals/citizens does not jeopardize Rawls’ liberalism; rather, it advances it since there is an inherent progressivism within liberal philosophy itself.
Nevertheless, Rawls still needs to further his commitment to individualism to truly encompass liberal philosophy. In order for individuals to preserve their liberties and be functional members of a liberal society (i.e. ability to participate and run for office), they need to have equal access, meaning that “fair background social conditions” are necessary; this can be maintained through education and “eliminating unjust discrimination” (115). In much the same manner, liberal peoples also have a duty to help, through institutional establishment, what Rawls terms, burdened societies, which do not have the institutional/political capabilities/framework to help themselves (106) as they are fundamentally interested in a liberal conception of justice (33). Yet, in both cases, as long as the disparity is to the advantage of the least favored, there is no duty to lower income gaps (114). Also, the difference principle is excluded from the church and family (158). Thus, just as liberalism is supposedly a politics of liberation, the goal here is to create a society which maintains equal liberties for all.
Conclusively, it is understandable how Rawls would like his readers to be focused on the just distribution, not the denial, of liberties. Moreover, Rawls’ theory conceptualizes the evolution of liberalism in the United States and skillfully tries to find and maintain the equilibrium between the two supposedly divergent notions. Consequently, he not only skillfully amalgamates freedom and equality, but also individualism and collectivism; justifying all the anti-individualist policies above and achieving what is arguably the core motive for liberal philosophy. Ultimately, this amalgamation is a significant complement to liberalism as it in enhances its progressivism and fruition.
All Works Cited From: John, Rawls, The Law of Peoples. New York: Harvard University Press, 2001. Print.
Monday, November 23, 2009
The ideal forms of a man and a woman
Plato describes the forms as the ideas we obtain from our particular real world experiences. There are ideal forms of men, and, on the other side, ideal forms of women, created through our perspectives and inculcated by the media. Yet, the world is filled with the particular versions of these forms, and they vary in degree, in their form of a man and woman.
Monday, October 5, 2009
Ireland votes ´yes´ on the Lisbon Treaty, so will the EU will become a state?
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/04/tony-blair-eu-presidency-race
http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=318196&version=1&template_id=38&parent_id=20
NOTES
Effectively, the EU will soon have the same definition of a state, but it´s not a state. The EU is getting a central bank, uniform laws and an army... but its not a state.
Maybe its a new type of state, one where you no longer need a distinctive culture or language... no, wait, never mind.
Why don´t the ´Yes´ countries get a second vote?
Best 2 out of 3 for Ireland?
http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=318196&version=1&template_id=38&parent_id=20
NOTES
Effectively, the EU will soon have the same definition of a state, but it´s not a state. The EU is getting a central bank, uniform laws and an army... but its not a state.
Maybe its a new type of state, one where you no longer need a distinctive culture or language... no, wait, never mind.
Why don´t the ´Yes´ countries get a second vote?
Best 2 out of 3 for Ireland?
The bailout brought on a jobless recovery!
¨Oct. 1: Stocks Have Worst Day in Three Months¨ - AP
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yfwwoQr3RW0
¨It's Jobless because it isn't a recovery!¨ - Peter Schiff
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hg-S0m6_C54
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c8nrZthYbNM
Peter gets laughed at, then wins the debate.
I just don´t know if politics is the right path for him.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yfwwoQr3RW0
¨It's Jobless because it isn't a recovery!¨ - Peter Schiff
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hg-S0m6_C54
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c8nrZthYbNM
Peter gets laughed at, then wins the debate.
I just don´t know if politics is the right path for him.
Wednesday, September 30, 2009
Justice in Anarchy
The perceived subjectivity of ethics and justice within society complicates contemplations of how justice can be maintained especially in an anarchic world where no single agent has this knowledge. Thomas Hobbes, an English philosopher who had grown up in a time of civil war and strife, reasoned that, through the rational consent of self-interested individuals, the burden of bringing order, justice and an objective ethic could be set on the shoulders of a hegemonic violent territorial monopoly (i.e. state). Yet, because state power is limited to its domain, effectively dividing citizens from human beings (Makinda 21), the international order is one where justice is solely defined by states; meaning that the problem of subjectivity can only be solved within a certain sphere and beyond that, supposedly, nothing can be unjust (Hobbes 188). In this essay, we will be examining Hobbes’ state of nature in relation to reality and investigating its implications on the current world order. Subsequently, we will conclude that Hobbes’ state of nature is ultimately a poor design of anarchic behavior as it does not take into account the power of institutional (e.g. NGOs) and individual justice establishment; while, at the same time, trusting other individuals, those who have the power of the state, to do the same. Overall, we will be concluding that, contrary to Hobbes’ analysis, a hegemonic power is not the sole foundation for justice.
It would be wise to consider the inconsistencies of Hobbes’ design before exploring its implications on the current international order. Most obviously, although group self-determination supposedly provides the foundation for the creation and sovereignty of a state (Makinda 30), consent does not exist within this paradigm. Since undermining consensual relations, something which is typically viewed as just – maybe even by Hobbes (Beitz 30), the state violently legitimates itself as the ultimate decider of justice while all external justice is supposedly obsolete; as a result, states have the power to label unjust/amoral, self-interested actions as just, while voices of dissent are either subject to their bureaucracy or silenced. Furthermore, since states are composed of individuals, any claim regarding human behavior is necessarily a claim regarding state behavior. Thus, Hobbes’ negative paradigm of human behavior, which inevitably leads them to war (Beitz 29) (Hobbes 185), should also be applied to state behavior. Consequently, this discredits hopes of justice establishment through diplomacy, diversities in decision making (Makinda 27), state accountability (Makinda 29) or reform since its unjust methodology naturally attracts the most unjust individuals. Also, it is difficult to comprehend why states would not rationally give up their sovereignty onto a higher hegemonic power especially when individuals are expected to do the same. The argument is that states do not need to give up their sovereignty once they create conditions for society to flourish (i.e. industry) (Hobbes 186, 188). However, not only is the extent of ‘necessary power’ for a functioning state completely arbitrary, but also, following Hobbes’ hypothesis, individuals and states always seek to maximize [except one uses a monopoly on violence] thus sovereignty is not given up as a result of self-interest. Through this, we realize that the interacting agents within anarchy are not self-interested autonomous individuals, but rather, self-interested sovereign states with totalizing ambitions for justice (Makinda 30) not through peaceful negotiation but through power calculated diplomacy and violence; contradicting Hobbes’ very rationale for state creation and discrediting attempts to escape from anarchy using states (Beitz 31). Moreover, Hobbes’ anarchy excludes a recurring tit-for-tat situation amongst individuals which undervalues institutional cooperation overtime. As a result, this system tends to further the cause of war and injustice rather than of justice and morality.
Outlining the differences between individual and state methodology, sovereignty, justice and interest can help distinguish between societal/individual and political/international moral skepticism (Beitz 15). The state fallacy is the counter-intuitive reality that law does not breed cooperation, but rather, cooperation breeds’ law. Justice is an emergent phenomenon encompassing the customs, norms and ethics of localities, not a top-down strategy decided by the power wielders. States that recognize this emergent design are more likely to be diplomatic and inclusionary while those that do not are more prone to use violence and be exclusionary. States can, however, use justice as social constructs (Makinda 31) to argue for cultural relativism (Beitz 17), annex existing norms as their own to further their interests and, if there are external criticisms, imply a threat to their sovereignty. For example, lex mercatoria (i.e. merchant law) was an emergent progression by which justice had been executed until states fused it with common law as it increased tax revenue. These assumptions, of the state´s ability to establish justice, have encouraged state building around the world, sometimes resulting in disastrous consequences (e.g. Africa & Middle East). Likewise, monopolies have no incentive to bring about quality and, as a result, states are induced to further the political agendas of those who have its power (e.g. war on drugs, marriage laws, corporate welfare, victimless crimes, religious doctrine, etc.) and, especially in inclusionary states, cloak them as justice. Additionally, state sovereignty and borders provide barriers for states to point fingers at each other’s atrocities while ignoring and committing their own (e.g. USA versus Iran). Globalization provides some hope for justice and cooperation as states may be more incentivized to focus on their economic power while institutions, through intercommunication and diminishing border influence, may be able to ethically contest state sovereignty and authority for action by broadening and deepening perceptions of rights and justice (Makinda 33). States, however, do have the final word and, as we have seen in some past situations, some well-intentioned institutions can be prohibited or constrained (Makinda 21) as competition with the state is not tolerated, while others join the state apparatus, becoming corruptible in nature through monopolization.
In conclusion, it is unreasonable to think that states can establish and maintain justice as they are not only breaking it when they enforce it, but they are always looking after the interest of those who control them (e.g. lobbyists, politicians, majorities), whether or not it is aligned with justice; which is much more dangerous than individual self-interest, as it is incentivized to use, and is inherently, violent. Yet, this does not mean that justice is obsolete; instead it means that we must concentrate our reliance on institutional justice establishment while diminishing our use of violent means to solve our complex social problems. The evolution of justice should not cling on to utopian ideas about state reformation or a one world bureaucracy, but rather, decentralization/localization and autonomous decision making. The problem of subjectivity is complicated and can only be dealt with through philosophic thought, not quick fix solutions or pseudo-answers; as we are not necessarily in a world of all against all but rather, we are in a world of continual interaction and we must make the best of it.
Works Cited
Beitz, Charles R. Political theory and international relations: ‘International Relations as a State of Nature’. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1999. NetLibrary.com. Web.
Hobbes, Thomas, and C. B. MacPherson. Leviathan. New York: Penguin Classics, 1982. Print.
Makinda, Samuel M. Ethics of Global Governance: ‘Contesting Sovereignty’. Ed. Antonio Franceschet, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2009. Print.
It would be wise to consider the inconsistencies of Hobbes’ design before exploring its implications on the current international order. Most obviously, although group self-determination supposedly provides the foundation for the creation and sovereignty of a state (Makinda 30), consent does not exist within this paradigm. Since undermining consensual relations, something which is typically viewed as just – maybe even by Hobbes (Beitz 30), the state violently legitimates itself as the ultimate decider of justice while all external justice is supposedly obsolete; as a result, states have the power to label unjust/amoral, self-interested actions as just, while voices of dissent are either subject to their bureaucracy or silenced. Furthermore, since states are composed of individuals, any claim regarding human behavior is necessarily a claim regarding state behavior. Thus, Hobbes’ negative paradigm of human behavior, which inevitably leads them to war (Beitz 29) (Hobbes 185), should also be applied to state behavior. Consequently, this discredits hopes of justice establishment through diplomacy, diversities in decision making (Makinda 27), state accountability (Makinda 29) or reform since its unjust methodology naturally attracts the most unjust individuals. Also, it is difficult to comprehend why states would not rationally give up their sovereignty onto a higher hegemonic power especially when individuals are expected to do the same. The argument is that states do not need to give up their sovereignty once they create conditions for society to flourish (i.e. industry) (Hobbes 186, 188). However, not only is the extent of ‘necessary power’ for a functioning state completely arbitrary, but also, following Hobbes’ hypothesis, individuals and states always seek to maximize [except one uses a monopoly on violence] thus sovereignty is not given up as a result of self-interest. Through this, we realize that the interacting agents within anarchy are not self-interested autonomous individuals, but rather, self-interested sovereign states with totalizing ambitions for justice (Makinda 30) not through peaceful negotiation but through power calculated diplomacy and violence; contradicting Hobbes’ very rationale for state creation and discrediting attempts to escape from anarchy using states (Beitz 31). Moreover, Hobbes’ anarchy excludes a recurring tit-for-tat situation amongst individuals which undervalues institutional cooperation overtime. As a result, this system tends to further the cause of war and injustice rather than of justice and morality.
Outlining the differences between individual and state methodology, sovereignty, justice and interest can help distinguish between societal/individual and political/international moral skepticism (Beitz 15). The state fallacy is the counter-intuitive reality that law does not breed cooperation, but rather, cooperation breeds’ law. Justice is an emergent phenomenon encompassing the customs, norms and ethics of localities, not a top-down strategy decided by the power wielders. States that recognize this emergent design are more likely to be diplomatic and inclusionary while those that do not are more prone to use violence and be exclusionary. States can, however, use justice as social constructs (Makinda 31) to argue for cultural relativism (Beitz 17), annex existing norms as their own to further their interests and, if there are external criticisms, imply a threat to their sovereignty. For example, lex mercatoria (i.e. merchant law) was an emergent progression by which justice had been executed until states fused it with common law as it increased tax revenue. These assumptions, of the state´s ability to establish justice, have encouraged state building around the world, sometimes resulting in disastrous consequences (e.g. Africa & Middle East). Likewise, monopolies have no incentive to bring about quality and, as a result, states are induced to further the political agendas of those who have its power (e.g. war on drugs, marriage laws, corporate welfare, victimless crimes, religious doctrine, etc.) and, especially in inclusionary states, cloak them as justice. Additionally, state sovereignty and borders provide barriers for states to point fingers at each other’s atrocities while ignoring and committing their own (e.g. USA versus Iran). Globalization provides some hope for justice and cooperation as states may be more incentivized to focus on their economic power while institutions, through intercommunication and diminishing border influence, may be able to ethically contest state sovereignty and authority for action by broadening and deepening perceptions of rights and justice (Makinda 33). States, however, do have the final word and, as we have seen in some past situations, some well-intentioned institutions can be prohibited or constrained (Makinda 21) as competition with the state is not tolerated, while others join the state apparatus, becoming corruptible in nature through monopolization.
In conclusion, it is unreasonable to think that states can establish and maintain justice as they are not only breaking it when they enforce it, but they are always looking after the interest of those who control them (e.g. lobbyists, politicians, majorities), whether or not it is aligned with justice; which is much more dangerous than individual self-interest, as it is incentivized to use, and is inherently, violent. Yet, this does not mean that justice is obsolete; instead it means that we must concentrate our reliance on institutional justice establishment while diminishing our use of violent means to solve our complex social problems. The evolution of justice should not cling on to utopian ideas about state reformation or a one world bureaucracy, but rather, decentralization/localization and autonomous decision making. The problem of subjectivity is complicated and can only be dealt with through philosophic thought, not quick fix solutions or pseudo-answers; as we are not necessarily in a world of all against all but rather, we are in a world of continual interaction and we must make the best of it.
Works Cited
Beitz, Charles R. Political theory and international relations: ‘International Relations as a State of Nature’. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1999. NetLibrary.com. Web.
Hobbes, Thomas, and C. B. MacPherson. Leviathan. New York: Penguin Classics, 1982. Print.
Makinda, Samuel M. Ethics of Global Governance: ‘Contesting Sovereignty’. Ed. Antonio Franceschet, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2009. Print.
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