The philosophy of liberalism is one with a rich and profound history even before it was first authored by early enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke with manuscripts like the Magna Carta and even the Cyrus Cylinder. Yet, only recently has this philosophy been radically enhanced with the introduction of the revolutionary ideas of John Rawls. Instead of a starting from a state of nature where individuals create states in order to protect their life, liberty and property, Rawls asks what the best society would be, for reasonable people, if they did not know who they were going to become before coming into existence; this conception is otherwise known as the veil of ignorance [hereby known as veil] (31). From this, Rawls constructs what he terms as the society of peoples (3) which is composed of accountable, human rights oriented, democratic states which maintain freedom and equality (24). However, unlike the older, more conventional definition of a state (i.e. Webers’ violent monopoly within a given domain), this new type of state does not have the traditional powers of sovereignty which states are usually assumed to have (25). These new states have been termed peoples as they have moral natures, are united by the common sympathies of their individuals, serve the fundamental needs of their citizens [through an accountable democratic arrangement], and adhere to the law of peoples as outlined by reasonable people behind the veil (23). Yet, Rawls’ theory which uses peoples, rather than individuals or citizens, as the moral actors within society (17) has led some to question Rawls’ liberalism (i.e. why not the laws of individuals?). This essay will analyze these claims and compare Rawls’ ideas with the ideas of liberalism to conclude whether or not the law of peoples and liberal philosophy are indeed compatible. After an assessment of Rawls’ criticisms, a thorough examination of the evolution of liberalism and an analysis on the intentions and implications of Rawls’ theory, this essay will attempt to prove that Rawls’ theory is indeed mutually inclusive and compatible with liberal philosophy as a whole.
Rawls’ utopia does, indeed, limit individualism by justifying the use of force in some cases (26). Although Rawls acknowledges and respects them (36), he explicitly denies the individuality and ultimately marginalizes individuals behind the veil who have different capabilities and styles of reasoning (i.e. those who do not come to Rawls’ conclusion) by labeling them as non-rational, merely ‘decent’ or something analogous. Moreover, a right to independence or self determination, a crucial aspect of individualism and autonomy, is limited to whether the action is deemed to be socially just by those behind the veil (38). However, not only is this type of social justice left undefined, but the only example we are given does not have a historically accurate representation of why their potential succession was unjust (i.e. Rawls’ reasoning for the illegitimacy of the south’s right to succeed was a result of the injustices of slavery but many historians suppose that there were other, more important reasons for the increased interest in succession). In reality, if a group sees itself to be marginalized and is interested in succession, it will definitely have no incentive to ask the polis, or consult those behind the veil, whether their actions would be consistent with social justice; rather, they would find their own justifications and act as they deem fit. Most strikingly, although their nature does not change, the motives of individuals certainly changes once they escape the veil. Thus, it becomes increasingly difficult to answer why individuals would act in accordance with Rawls’ theory especially with the problems stated above [heterogeneous rationalities] or if they gain the power of elected officials. Presumably they are indecent, irrational or unjust but if so, they would not care as that is how their nature (maximize resources, minimize risks), the same nature which compelled them to the social compact behind the veil (7), compels them to operate outside the veil; one cannot homogenize individuals within and outside the veil. Also, even though peoples do not hold the same powers of sovereignty of states, peoples still have the right to limit an individual’s right to mobility/immigration within their territory (39). Furthermore, Rawls’ conceptions view the natural abilities of individuals to be a collective asset [rather than owned by the individual] for which society has the right and duty to utilize but this obviously infringes on the individual liberties of some for various subjective principles of collective justice or social equality. Yet still, we must recognize that the philosophy of liberalism holds equality to be just as important as individualism and accusing Rawls’ theory to be illiberal by only focusing on one aspect would be an incomplete assertion.
Over the last century in the United States, historical events shaped liberalism to include positive rights (i.e. equalities - e.g. job, education, welfare, etc.) to the older, constitutional negative rights (i.e. freedoms - e.g. life, property, speech, etc.). This came with the constitutional reforms of Woodrow Wilson, the economic reforms of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 60’s reform protests (e.g. sexual/drug revolution, war remonstrations etc.). Wilson’s constitutional reforms were part of a progressive movement away from the 18th century document and onto a living constitution as the fixed nature of the old constitution meant that self-interest was encouraged and rights were also fixed. Roosevelt’s new deal argued that having freedom of speech meant nothing to a starving man. And finally, the 60’s movements were a result of the new freedoms that could be enjoyed as a result of the necessities provided by the state; it was a move away from the traditional responsibilities (i.e. self-reliance) that were needed in order to enjoy freedom in the previous era. Initially, these new rights were meant for individuals but it had become increasingly important to protect people’s identities as it was defined by an individual’s group (e.g. gay and women rights, racial equality, workers etc.) rather than individuals themselves. Thus, liberalism had grown from an individualist philosophy of negative rights and freedoms to a more collectivist ideology and a new type of duty-filled freedom; meaning that, although the freedom to pursue passions had grown as the state could provide for necessities, paying for these new freedoms resulted in a duty with a higher tax burden. These new collective rights were a subset of the older, individual rights and consequently, a new type of liberalism had emerged from the old Lockean conception of liberalism. Rawls’ theory not only fits, but may even legitimize these reforms. Therefore, although it can be understood that the above criticisms against Rawls are those that encompass the older conceptions of liberalism and not liberalism as it stands today, it can also be argued that Rawls’ theory of peoples, which includes the principles of justice – liberty (i.e. an equal right to pursue happiness compatible with the liberty of others) and the difference principles (i.e. social/economic disparities only to the extent that it helps the worst-off in society) (14), beautifully amalgamates the two pillars of liberalism, freedom and equality, formed within a democratic society. As a result, using the notion of peoples rather than individuals/citizens does not jeopardize Rawls’ liberalism; rather, it advances it since there is an inherent progressivism within liberal philosophy itself.
Nevertheless, Rawls still needs to further his commitment to individualism to truly encompass liberal philosophy. In order for individuals to preserve their liberties and be functional members of a liberal society (i.e. ability to participate and run for office), they need to have equal access, meaning that “fair background social conditions” are necessary; this can be maintained through education and “eliminating unjust discrimination” (115). In much the same manner, liberal peoples also have a duty to help, through institutional establishment, what Rawls terms, burdened societies, which do not have the institutional/political capabilities/framework to help themselves (106) as they are fundamentally interested in a liberal conception of justice (33). Yet, in both cases, as long as the disparity is to the advantage of the least favored, there is no duty to lower income gaps (114). Also, the difference principle is excluded from the church and family (158). Thus, just as liberalism is supposedly a politics of liberation, the goal here is to create a society which maintains equal liberties for all.
Conclusively, it is understandable how Rawls would like his readers to be focused on the just distribution, not the denial, of liberties. Moreover, Rawls’ theory conceptualizes the evolution of liberalism in the United States and skillfully tries to find and maintain the equilibrium between the two supposedly divergent notions. Consequently, he not only skillfully amalgamates freedom and equality, but also individualism and collectivism; justifying all the anti-individualist policies above and achieving what is arguably the core motive for liberal philosophy. Ultimately, this amalgamation is a significant complement to liberalism as it in enhances its progressivism and fruition.
All Works Cited From: John, Rawls, The Law of Peoples. New York: Harvard University Press, 2001. Print.
