The perceived subjectivity of ethics and justice within society complicates contemplations of how justice can be maintained especially in an anarchic world where no single agent has this knowledge. Thomas Hobbes, an English philosopher who had grown up in a time of civil war and strife, reasoned that, through the rational consent of self-interested individuals, the burden of bringing order, justice and an objective ethic could be set on the shoulders of a hegemonic violent territorial monopoly (i.e. state). Yet, because state power is limited to its domain, effectively dividing citizens from human beings (Makinda 21), the international order is one where justice is solely defined by states; meaning that the problem of subjectivity can only be solved within a certain sphere and beyond that, supposedly, nothing can be unjust (Hobbes 188). In this essay, we will be examining Hobbes’ state of nature in relation to reality and investigating its implications on the current world order. Subsequently, we will conclude that Hobbes’ state of nature is ultimately a poor design of anarchic behavior as it does not take into account the power of institutional (e.g. NGOs) and individual justice establishment; while, at the same time, trusting other individuals, those who have the power of the state, to do the same. Overall, we will be concluding that, contrary to Hobbes’ analysis, a hegemonic power is not the sole foundation for justice.
It would be wise to consider the inconsistencies of Hobbes’ design before exploring its implications on the current international order. Most obviously, although group self-determination supposedly provides the foundation for the creation and sovereignty of a state (Makinda 30), consent does not exist within this paradigm. Since undermining consensual relations, something which is typically viewed as just – maybe even by Hobbes (Beitz 30), the state violently legitimates itself as the ultimate decider of justice while all external justice is supposedly obsolete; as a result, states have the power to label unjust/amoral, self-interested actions as just, while voices of dissent are either subject to their bureaucracy or silenced. Furthermore, since states are composed of individuals, any claim regarding human behavior is necessarily a claim regarding state behavior. Thus, Hobbes’ negative paradigm of human behavior, which inevitably leads them to war (Beitz 29) (Hobbes 185), should also be applied to state behavior. Consequently, this discredits hopes of justice establishment through diplomacy, diversities in decision making (Makinda 27), state accountability (Makinda 29) or reform since its unjust methodology naturally attracts the most unjust individuals. Also, it is difficult to comprehend why states would not rationally give up their sovereignty onto a higher hegemonic power especially when individuals are expected to do the same. The argument is that states do not need to give up their sovereignty once they create conditions for society to flourish (i.e. industry) (Hobbes 186, 188). However, not only is the extent of ‘necessary power’ for a functioning state completely arbitrary, but also, following Hobbes’ hypothesis, individuals and states always seek to maximize [except one uses a monopoly on violence] thus sovereignty is not given up as a result of self-interest. Through this, we realize that the interacting agents within anarchy are not self-interested autonomous individuals, but rather, self-interested sovereign states with totalizing ambitions for justice (Makinda 30) not through peaceful negotiation but through power calculated diplomacy and violence; contradicting Hobbes’ very rationale for state creation and discrediting attempts to escape from anarchy using states (Beitz 31). Moreover, Hobbes’ anarchy excludes a recurring tit-for-tat situation amongst individuals which undervalues institutional cooperation overtime. As a result, this system tends to further the cause of war and injustice rather than of justice and morality.
Outlining the differences between individual and state methodology, sovereignty, justice and interest can help distinguish between societal/individual and political/international moral skepticism (Beitz 15). The state fallacy is the counter-intuitive reality that law does not breed cooperation, but rather, cooperation breeds’ law. Justice is an emergent phenomenon encompassing the customs, norms and ethics of localities, not a top-down strategy decided by the power wielders. States that recognize this emergent design are more likely to be diplomatic and inclusionary while those that do not are more prone to use violence and be exclusionary. States can, however, use justice as social constructs (Makinda 31) to argue for cultural relativism (Beitz 17), annex existing norms as their own to further their interests and, if there are external criticisms, imply a threat to their sovereignty. For example, lex mercatoria (i.e. merchant law) was an emergent progression by which justice had been executed until states fused it with common law as it increased tax revenue. These assumptions, of the state´s ability to establish justice, have encouraged state building around the world, sometimes resulting in disastrous consequences (e.g. Africa & Middle East). Likewise, monopolies have no incentive to bring about quality and, as a result, states are induced to further the political agendas of those who have its power (e.g. war on drugs, marriage laws, corporate welfare, victimless crimes, religious doctrine, etc.) and, especially in inclusionary states, cloak them as justice. Additionally, state sovereignty and borders provide barriers for states to point fingers at each other’s atrocities while ignoring and committing their own (e.g. USA versus Iran). Globalization provides some hope for justice and cooperation as states may be more incentivized to focus on their economic power while institutions, through intercommunication and diminishing border influence, may be able to ethically contest state sovereignty and authority for action by broadening and deepening perceptions of rights and justice (Makinda 33). States, however, do have the final word and, as we have seen in some past situations, some well-intentioned institutions can be prohibited or constrained (Makinda 21) as competition with the state is not tolerated, while others join the state apparatus, becoming corruptible in nature through monopolization.
In conclusion, it is unreasonable to think that states can establish and maintain justice as they are not only breaking it when they enforce it, but they are always looking after the interest of those who control them (e.g. lobbyists, politicians, majorities), whether or not it is aligned with justice; which is much more dangerous than individual self-interest, as it is incentivized to use, and is inherently, violent. Yet, this does not mean that justice is obsolete; instead it means that we must concentrate our reliance on institutional justice establishment while diminishing our use of violent means to solve our complex social problems. The evolution of justice should not cling on to utopian ideas about state reformation or a one world bureaucracy, but rather, decentralization/localization and autonomous decision making. The problem of subjectivity is complicated and can only be dealt with through philosophic thought, not quick fix solutions or pseudo-answers; as we are not necessarily in a world of all against all but rather, we are in a world of continual interaction and we must make the best of it.
Works Cited
Beitz, Charles R. Political theory and international relations: ‘International Relations as a State of Nature’. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1999. NetLibrary.com. Web.
Hobbes, Thomas, and C. B. MacPherson. Leviathan. New York: Penguin Classics, 1982. Print.
Makinda, Samuel M. Ethics of Global Governance: ‘Contesting Sovereignty’. Ed. Antonio Franceschet, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2009. Print.
