After a history of state warfare, probably the foremost cause of human bloodshed, many are questioning the possibility of a lasting peace among states, giving strength to the political philosophy of realism. The philosophy is one that uses the primal survival instincts of human beings to highlight the significance of anarchy and its consequence of war being an unavoidable reality in international relations. Furthermore, one can easily observe the practical impacts of the realist ideology at work in the real world. Conversely, although through some perspectives realism may be gaining momentum, other philosophical perspectives see it to be a theory which excludes critical factors, lacks consistency and has a self-prophesizing nature. After examining realism and clarifying some criticisms, it will be understood that although realism can explain the nature of state-behavior in its analysis, it leaves out the most crucial aspect of the state, the individual, which is the major weakness of the theory.
Realism starts by trying to find and understand the objective laws, which are rooted in human nature, that govern society (Morgenthau 7). One of the primary goals of a human being is to ensure their own security and survival thus they would transfer their sovereignty onto a state so that safety can be collectively protected. Therefore, states have an ultimate duty to protect their own security. Power is then seen as the rational method by which security can be guaranteed; power can be anything that establishes control over people/nations (Morgenthau 11) and is usually employed through economic, diplomatic and military means (Mearsheimer 13). Much like an individual, the primary role of the state is to continue its existence within a world where there is no rule/contract enforcer, no court and war is likely and possible. States are the most important actors within the world system because they are the only entities which claim to be the moral authority - where one cannot apply universal moral principles to states - while making use of their self-legitimated monopoly on violence within their domains (Morgenthau 12). As a result of this, they are constantly at odds with each other as they all strive to be the ultimate moral authority or hegemon. Although domestic political affairs are important based on leadership qualities, size, location and the capabilities for attaining power, ultimately, it accounts for very little in a state’s behaviour since all states are likely to maximize their power in all situations as they have the same goal of security. Since a state holds the lives of many in its hands, it must try and act efficiently and rationally which means promoting its own self-interest in the face of an anarchic world and, unlike individuals, it loses its right to sacrifice itself for those not within its domain. Acting rationally also means that states need to make evaluative judgments of the position they are in, relative to other states within the world. This means that with every decision a state makes, there is a cost-benefit analysis which calculates the expected utility that will be gained from a choice. It also means that states are put into a situation of a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ with other states; where, simply put, a state cannot raise its own security/power/arms without threatening and reducing the security of another state. As a result, states are in a constant struggle with one another since they cannot know each others intentions and war is a real and likely possibility. And even though states may occasionally cooperate, at root they have conflicting interests as they are constantly striving to be the hegemon and gain relative power over one another (Mearsheimer). When the five assumptions of political realism are combined, including the fact that states have offensive military capabilities, states do not know each others intentions, states strive to survive, states act in rational and self interested ways and they do this all in an anarchic structure, we may also see the dangers that neo-realism claims the system inherently produces (Mearsheimer 29); in contrast to the human nature aspect that classical realism proposes. Neo-realist and realist thought are not necessarily at odds when it comes to a state’s fear from potential threats, rational self-interest and power maximization but differ in their premises for why they do what they do (i.e. human nature VS system structure). However, the concepts of regional and relative power can be used for both since these are the steps that need to be taken to become the absolute power.
Realists claim that in the real world, politicians may use liberal rhetoric when dealing with each other, when really politicians are using strictly realist philosophy to make their decisions. For example, during the war in Iraq, politicians used moral rhetoric to gain support for the war such as getting rid of a dictator, spreading democracy, enforcing civil rights, freeing the Iraqi people etc. but, within the higher echelons of government, they must have been discussing the economic power Iraq was draining from the United States by selling its oil in Euros rather than US dollars or the military advantage that will be gained with a base in Iraq especially with anti-American sentiment in Iran. There were also realist reasons that were open to the public such as threat of an Iraq holding weapons of mass destruction as it induced fear. Whatever the reasoning behind the plot, a realist would point to what s/he thinks are the real, rational, power maximizing and self-interested reasons as to why a state made the decision it did. Nations gain power through their influence on other nations, by force, by trade or by negotiation, and capabilities, through resource, knowledge and technology. The corruptibility in partnerships is very much a real phenomenon, where even after years of cooperation, interests change. The war in Iraq is also a prime example of a past partner, one which was obedient and cooperative, that started to siphon power away from the United States, working in its own self-interest, but where finally war ensued. Another example would be the ancient city states of Greece. Although always at war with each other, they tended to only band together when there were powerful intruders. The last example is the European Union where even though all the states say that, or at least claim that, they have the same interests, they would rather not give up their own sovereignty.
For a state, power is the ultimate goal and an end in itself. Power does not exclusively refer to the capability to use violence but also monetary and ambassadorial capabilities. One mistaken liberalist argument against realism is that realists pay too much attention to the problem of war and peace and not enough attention to the politics of economics or diplomacy. However, these are obviously issues of power mechanisms that states need and do address in the realist perspective. States have an overwhelming incentive to interfere with the economic situation within their domain as that is where they get their operation funding. The prominent ways a government could take control of an economy within its domain is by monopolizing the monetary system, so it would be easier to tax people and manipulate the money supply, and controlling the interest rates. This will also come in the forms of industry protection, subsidization, tax-cuts, tariffs etc. which always results in a mixed economy. In this way, a government can make sure that its home-grown businesses, the ones that bring home the bacon, are profitable. An economically powerful nation like the United States advocates open border policies while poorer nations that cannot compete obviously do not. Some nations, those that can compete in some sectors but not others interfere only when necessary; the Canadian government allows for freer trade when trading lumber but does not allow for exotic products to come back without a heavy tax (e.g. Persian rugs). Even in simple representations of nations, such as Dale Thomas's “Isle of Ted Simulation,” some countries have incentives to completely cut off trade as it can easily free ride or get benefits without paying. We can also point to the many instances of mercantilism, where firms help governments make money, and neo-mercantilism, where firms and governments help each other, such as the collaboration between the East India Company and England to exploit India’s resources with state protected monopolies and tariffs. Becoming a state-protected monopoly, like the water companies in Chile and Monsanto, is what many firms dream of becoming as they do not need to worry about being competitive, serving quality, or adjusting prices.
The general mixing of economic and military power creates huge incentives for government to make a business out of its military power; this is of course related to what President Dwight Eisenhower famously referred to as the “military-industrial complex”. Nations sell arms to themselves, as in the case within the United States where all parts from the same military vehicle are made by all 50 states so that every state can profit, they sell arms to other nations, as in the case with the Soviet Union after the cold war and Britain selling submarines to Canada, and they sell arms to non-state entities, as in the case with the United States and the Taliban and the countless states that sell arms to the people of Somalia. Some nations are able to hit two birds with one stone just by combining their military and economic goals. By selling old technologies that it itself can deal with, using its newer technology, it can keep up-to-date with newer mechanisms of power holding, make money and increase the potential of a multi-polar system in a distant region that does not need to be dealt with; both make the trade since one state gains absolute power and the other gains a relative power in its region, much like the current situation of the United States and Soviet Union.
Another way states flex their muscle is by using diplomatic means. This could mean having a huge populace of your citizens within another country as in the case with Russia and the former Soviet states. It could also mean recognizing the same interests (e.g. trading with comparative advantage and specialization) and ideals (e.g. democracy) of another nation with your own, signaling intent to cooperate. However, it is obvious that diplomatic power can only rest on a foundation of military power and it influences how much diplomatic power one has, that is, your bargaining power raises when you increase your military might. As a result, nations wouldn’t mind having an inarticulate leader if they had big guns.
Thus, because of the gains made in the relative-power system, the strive for its survival and security and its endless task to be the moral authority and world/regional hegemon, the decision for what a nation would do, when placed in an anarchic prisoner’s dilemma situation, has already been made; the choice is always to protect itself, protect its self-interest, and prolong its own existence even if this means doing the exact opposite for rival states. This is why states, according to realism, will always live in a war of all against all and why war is ultimately inevitable.
The cause of war for the realist comes from the tragedy of anarchy while the cause of war for the liberalist comes from evil and has to do with assumptions about morality. For liberalism, there is a differentiation between good states and bad states, where a good state cooperates, trades, represents its people (or at least the majority) through democracy, and rarely goes to war alone and bad states solve everything using force. Liberalism questions whether self-interest actually connects to power seeking through security and recognizes that the domestic political situation is important in a state’s behavior, such as the changes in Iran’s political and foreign policy after the Islamic revolution in 1979. It also views realist thought as indeterminate since there are many ways to deal with international pressures. In addition, liberals view the formation of cultural norms and morals to have some effect on the actions a state takes; for example the banning and freeing of gay marriage in different parts of the world. These concerns do have some merit but they eventually fall short of doing any long term damage to the theory since realists can argue that to be a rational self-interested state, the state should act as a power maximizer and for safety, everybody should expect states to do this and they can place any definition under the power scheme, including the control of norms (Morgenthau 9). This is why many view realism as being a self-prophesizing theory which is not necessarily an argument against it.
Constructivism criticizes realism by arguing that anarchy is what you make of it. This rings true to an extent as individuals who live in anarchy are not necessarily in a war of all against all. Realism however, is not necessarily saying that it is either but rather, it is saying that it would be best to assume this so as to protect yourself, just in case. Furthermore, constructivists claim that if we have a different outlook on this structure of anarchy (i.e. one of an evolving cooperation and interaction and changing our view from a cost-benefit analysis to one of social appropriateness), it would form in a cooperative manner. In this way, constructivism tries to be self-prophesizing.
Realism does, however, have some very fundamental flaws when it assumes that war is inevitable. First, even if we assume that self-interest is indeed apart of the nature of human beings and what human beings are motivated by, realism does not take into account that rational individuals would like nothing more than to avoid war, negotiate and trade as this is what is in their own self-interest. This is exactly what the foundations of economics rest upon. This process unconsciously creates a collective good as technologies becomes cheaper, more efficient and readily available causing progress, innovation and a better standard of living for all. The primary power that an individual strives to achieve is not military power but economic power since, for an individual, the size of your wallet matters more than the size of your gun. Individuals, unlike collective entities, have a limit to what can kill them (i.e. one bullet is enough) and therefore have a limit to the amount of military (but not economic) security they need, but its much harder for collective entities to die [where several nukes would probably be needed] so their security is almost limitless. In contrast, for a monopoly of force to retain its power in an anarchic world filled with other monopolies of force, it is crucial that it has a reasonable sized gun. While for an individual to retain their power in an anarchic world filled with other individuals, they won’t need any weapon that is too big to carry. War is only inevitable when monopolies on violence are vying for power.
Furthermore, unlike individuals, states are not allowed to sacrifice themselves for the sake of others, making them incredibly resilient to beneficence without self-interest; when Kuwait, a stable nation that had an already established oil extraction scheme, calls for help, the United States comes charging in to save the day but when Darfur, an unstable nation in need of investment, calls for help, the United States only rescues its own citizens. This adds to the notion that only states, not individuals, are prone to war as states are not even capable of beneficence.
Another essential difficulty to realism is the concept of state interests. States are only comprised of individuals and when one speaks of the ‘interests of the state’ one is ultimately talking about the ‘interests of those who call themselves the state’. It is impossible for anyone to claim that they represent the interests of a collective unless all of those individuals have contractually consented; so in a situation where there is no consent within the social contract, the closest one can get to reach a ‘collective interest’ is the interest of the majority. By speaking of state interest in this way, realists assume that a signed social contract manifests itself deep within the confines of human nature, which is more than just assumptive.
Additionally, realists assume that states do not exist and cannot be judged by universal moral laws but they can enforce them. Again, since states are basically groups of individuals, when one says that a state cannot be judged by universal moral laws is to say that one group of individuals get morality type A and the other group of individuals (who call themselves the state) get morality type B. Needless to say, this is one of the very causes of corruption and state tyranny. States solve the problem of violence using a monopoly of violence and solve the problem of theft using a monopoly of theft. It is incomprehensible to think that an objective universal moral reality exists, where states claim the moral authority, but not within the confines of parliament.
In conclusion, realists are right when they view states as violent, war mongering entities but miss the importance of individuals within the system. The ultimate end for a state is security and power, which means having enough influence so that everyone does exactly what they want them to do. Bargaining/diplomatic power is the end to, and economic power is the means to, military power. Throughout this essay, we examined realism, studied the prisoner’s dilemma, observed some practical real world explanations, investigated many forms of power maximizing, outlined some barriers and situations of eventual break downs for state cooperation and analyzed its relation to liberalism, neo-realism and constructivism. We then brought in some criticisms where some could be dismissed while others found themselves to be fundamental problems. Through all this, we have learned that realism explains at least some aspects of state behavior and the inevitability of war but ultimately, war is only the health of the state, not the health of individuals. Although living in a war of all against all may be true in a world filled with monopolies on violence, in a world of individuals, this notion is completely flawed. The problem is our view that we live in a world of states but in reality, we live in a world of individuals. In our current situation, some individuals (those that call themselves the state) live in relative anarchy while others live within the confines of a moral authority. Overall, we have learned that war is only inevitable when monopolies on violence fight to keep, hold and expand their power and their domain where their monopoly is protected.
Works Cited
Mearsheimer, John J. "Anarchy and the Struggle for power." Tragedy of great power politics. New York, N.Y: W.W. Norton, 2003. 1-45.
Morgenthau, Hans J. "Politics Among Nations: Six Principles of Political Realism." International Politics. 1985. 7-14.
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