People fail to recognize the idiocy of nationalism due to the randomness of birth. However, some of these same people still recognize the unfairness of birth as one may be born into a rich family and receive large inheritance while another may be born in a poor family within a poor, war-torn, country. Then we see people like Thomas Pogge proclaim that we have some sort of positive right to help these people.
A) Randomness has the capability of being unfair.
B) If you work for your capital, you can give the product of your labour to anybody, including your children. This can be viewed as 'unfair' or not, but the fact is, there is no obligation to help the world and there is nothing immoral about choosing someone over another to get your pay.
Saturday, April 18, 2009
Wednesday, April 15, 2009
McGill became aware last Friday of a threatening graffiti message
"As you may know, McGill became aware last Friday of a threatening graffiti message written on a bathroom wall... The Montreal police were immediately contacted by McGill Security; they responded rapidly and are continuing to investigate and collaborate closely with us. We and the Montreal police are taking this situation seriously... heightened our security... ."
I have no idea what the message said..."Rich Bitch Mcgill Doomsday" according to my friend... so I cannot assume the precise 'level' of threat. However, I do know that searching peoples bags is crossing the line...
"In addition to an increased Security presence on both campuses, you may notice signs indicating that bags and backpacks may be subject to search. This step is part of our increased security measures and we thank you for your co-operation in this regard. Nonetheless, we believe there is no imminent danger to the McGill community."
Doomsday may just be the guys name... I'm pretty sure that's how graffiti writers work.... although his shyt was wahck.
Doomsday may have referred to 'exam period' ?
I don't know, that's all I can think of.
Or...
Doomsday could mean some sort of... 'terrorist attack'...
Walk-through metal detectors are cool, and aren't a hassle.
Too expensive? Rent. I'm sure we will find good deals..
And who was the TARGET?
McGill Students?
Does that mean he is, or is not a McGill student?
Probably not... as when people join a particular group, they tend to stick to that group.
See, (google it): "The tree of experience in the forest of information: Overweighing experienced relative to observed information."
So the chances are he is an outsider, then why are we harassing our own students?
If he is a McGill student, on the other hand, he probably wouldn't know what to do with himself. Exams are gonna be full of cops.
He is now most likely aware that he must get rid of all evidence and will do his best to blend in with the crowd. Chances of getting him are low.
If he is from outside the school, it is not only more likely to be a threat, he will probably do it depending on how 'good' he is. Whether he will continue with his word or not is also up to how bad of a gambler he is... how desperate he is.
Chances of an actual threat, however, are ultimately low. I say invest in some [subtle] metal detectors and move on.
My hunch is that, the kid is probably outside of 'New Rez' and he was just trying to diss them (Or She?).
See, intuition does have its place (Read Essay Below).
Well, in any case, i don't really care whether the government and their cops get their man. McGill police on the other hand...
EDIT: April 18: Looks like It was not the doomsday thing. I will try to find out what it was soon.
Sunday, April 12, 2009
The Bridge Between: Finding the Link Between Reason and Intuition
In this essay, we will be exploring the relationships between rationality and intuition, comparing their portrayal of ethical truths while pointing out their values and weaknesses. Rationality or reason is a logical justification or a valid explanation of some sort of phenomenon. Intuition, on the other hand, is something that is spontaneously derived at or prompted by a natural tendency without requiring a conscious thought. If the world had only one colour, orange, and if we were to sympathise with or become that colour, we would intuitively view ourselves as being a mixture of red and yellow (Bergson 186). Practically, we can think of intuition as the feeling a sailor gets when there is an oncoming storm or the senses a hunter uses to determine where the deer are roaming in the wilderness. One can use their faculty of reason or their faculty of intuition to establish what is right and wrong within a given moral scenario; we can use our intuition to identify that killing an innocent person is wrong and we can use our reason to come up with a [Kantian] method which says that dishonesty is wrong because it ceases to uphold the institution of language which relies on truth. Through intuition, we use moral truths to help us solve practical problems while, through reason, we solve practical problems to help us find moral truths (Korsgaard 9) and this is where the divide in methodology becomes apparent. Here I will attempt to show that first, the relationship between reason and intuition is not necessarily a dichotomy and that second, although the malleability of intuition is precarious and its lack of universality is untrustworthy when compared to reason, it existence is useful to fill the gaps that reason ultimately cannot cover; only by a mutual cooperation between intuition and reason can we ever hope to achieve any moral truths.
Before we begin our deliberation, it would be best to outline the matter in which reason and intuition are not necessarily at odds. We can witness how human beings do not morally blame those who lack a ‘fully functional faculty of reason’ (hereby known as F.R.) - (e.g. the elderly, the mentally disabled, children, animals etc.). If one cannot reason, one cannot come up with rational procedures for solving practical moral problems. Therefore, moral blame cannot be assigned to those who are incapable of reasoning (e.g. we do not prosecute children and adults in the same court). Furthermore, nobody expects a person who is lacking a F.R. to have the right intuitions when facing a practical moral problem (e.g. where one expects a person with a F.R. to intuitively want to save a child from drowning in a small pool in front of them by simply picking them up, one does not expect a person who lacks a F.R. - e.g. mentally disabled, elderly, etc. - to have this same intuition), meaning that individuals who lack having a F.R. also lack having a fully functional faculty of intuition (hereby known as F.I.). This points to the notion that intuition and reason are not really mutually exclusive and that their conflict is not necessarily a dichotomy. This also helps answer why there is a common likelihood for intuition and reason to agree in so many cases and how two people may arrive at the same conclusion when one believes he has done it intuitively while the other believes he has done it rationally. To further the explanation of the above claim, we can observe that the quality of the faculties of reason and intuition are a matter of degree, just as it is with moral blameworthiness (e.g. we assign a higher degree of moral blame on a 10 year old then a 5 year old). Many factors can vary these degrees including the developing phases of human growth, the severity of a mental disability and even the progression of an animal’s evolution.
Not only does moral advancement happen throughout human history, but it happens through the history of all creatures, just as there is a biological evolutionary advancement. Empirical evidence shows actions of supposed intuitive ‘moral behaviours’ from all sorts of animals including monkeys, dolphins, buffalos, hippos and dogs - even towards animals of different species. These are animals who may be viewed as having the capability of reaching the last step of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, striving for some sort of self-actualization. Take for instance the monkey protest: when a monkey finds out that another monkey has been given a higher share of a reward for the same amount of work, the monkey protests by going on strike and not continuing his work or doing something else (Brosnan). It is unlikely that the monkey is actually reasoning out some moral notion of equality, rather it is more probable that it is just recognizing the intrinsic wrongness of inequality within that given situation. These intuitive moral behaviours have most likely formed out of an animals primal survival instincts. Human beings not only recognize the unfairness of the situation as monkeys do but also try to build some sort of theory or justification around it so that their community can be steered towards trying to avoid further situations of unfairness because nobody likes being in that position. Comparing the differences between the mental capabilities of human beings and monkeys with their potentiality for intuitive or rationalized morality indicates that reason may be an evolutionary extension or expansion upon intuition instead of something that has been formed independently.
So far, having disassembled the dichotomy and having shown that reason and intuition are more likely to be mutual inclusive than at odds, we are now in a much better position to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each method.
The main power of intuition is triggered by forces of emotion. When one witnesses a brutal murder or rape, the sympathy that is felt for the victim creates a moral sentiment which labels that action as being ‘wrong’. This labelling process requires no method of reasoning, rather, it is powered by our emotional faculties. The significance of reason is then devalued since it is not necessarily needed to make moral judgments (Hume 84).
Here we are left with the problem of trying to prove and regain the significance of reason; for this, it would seem necessary to integrate facts and values, otherwise known as deriving an ought from an is. The supposition is that, if we were to look at the real world, we would find nothing that tells us how we ought to act (e.g. a rock that is falling down a cliff does not have a destination in which it ‘ought’ to land) - (Hume 1.1.27). However, we can see that values are only important to living things (i.e. dead people do not have any values) meaning that value only exists because life exists. To keep these values, living things ought to try to survive and this need for survival also becomes of value (Rand 923). If one does not have any values, one is only capable of feeling pain (e.g. if one does not value survival, one may not value food meaning that they can only starve to death). Morality then, comes out of the value one has to survive and can be in the form of intuition or reason; just as the monkey who would rather do something else than work for unequal pay because her work is less valued (explained above). Through evolution, human beings have developed and expanded their faculty of intuition with a faculty of reason, which is more precise, universal and more objective, to help assist them with survival while other animals have found other ways to help them survive and keep hold of their values (i.e. intuition and reason are faculties which help us survive and survival is necessary for the existence of value). Much like intuition and reason, facts and values may also be mutually inclusive.
Another positive feature of Intuition is its ability to, if someone was to somehow justify the permissibility of an immoral act (e.g. rape) through reason, immediately disagree and stump the new proposal from reason. However there are cases where reason has the ability to change intuitive notions. For example, before Columbus sailed to the new world, it was intuitively true that the world was flat. Yet, through the reasoning developed by the ancient worlds, intuition changed from a flat earth to an earth that is shaped more like the moon. A more modern example can be extracted out of the field of economics. In economics, various actions that are deemed to be right are necessarily counter-intuitive - but only counter-intuitive for those who have not studied economics. Even basic capitalistic ideals are counter-intuitive such as the efficiency of a spontaneous and decentralized order.
Now I would like to address the risk involved when using intuition to come up with moral judgments. The biggest problem intuition has to face is itself; two people can have two different views on what is intuitively correct. Also, intuitions are likely to change depending on certain circumstances. In the trolley case, where one must decide to save five people by killing one, people have different conclusions as to what actions they would take depending on various factors (e.g. whether they are actively doing it - flicking a switch versus pushing someone in the way of the trolley) even when these factors do not alter the result. Through this, we have recognized that human beings have different reasons and intuitions on what they should value (e.g. consequences, intentions, etc.). Another example is the case of abortion, where one person may intuitively think that killing an innocent person is wrong and the other may intuitively think that taking away a person’s right to choose is wrong - this is an argument that may arise from the different intuitions people have on what a person actually is. Furthermore, it is normal for intuitions to change depending on emotion. One study shows that people are more likely to cheat and steal when someone from their own group cheats and steals and people are less likely to cheat and steal when someone in another group cheats and steals. Intuitions actually change depending on ‘group think’ pointing to the notion that intuitions are culturally/collectively relative. In the same study, it was found that it is more likely for more people to cheat a little rather than for some people to cheat a lot. The theory is that people like to think of themselves as being ‘good’ so if someone from their own group does something wrong, they are more inclined to do it because they recognize that person as being apart of them (and vice versa when they are not apart of their group). In the same way, stealing a lot is viewed to be ‘bad’ while stealing a little is viewed to be trivial so more people are inclined to do trivial bad actions so they would not think of themselves as being ‘bad’ (Ariely). This is why intuitions of good and bad vary depending on their feelings at the time. As a result, we can see that conflicting moralities for certain dilemmas cannot be solved using intuition alone as they rely solely on emotional experience; alternatively, rationality has a much better method to resolve disputes and relativity, using an objective method of science and logic. In fact, it makes intuitive sense for us to use rationality to debate controversial issues rather than use arguments from intuition or emotion as there is no way to prove one person’s emotion to be ‘more right‘ than another. We intuitively want to find a true answer (an answer where there can be no dispute) so our intuition actually tells us to use reason. Only rationality can bring us closer to truth as what it tries to find is testable, evident and universal. Truth, whether or not it exists, becomes increasingly valuable, as there are less controversies to debate, the closer we get to it. An act should be deemed right because of the right reasons - as their validity can be debated - not because of some preconceived intuitions of what the property of rightness holds (Korsgaard 3).
Reason, however, cannot contest intuition on all fronts. Although reason is more trustworthy than intuition, we cannot assume that reason is always the right answer (i.e. it has its limits and truth may not always be reachable). Ultimately, even if our feelings come from some sort of evolutionary survival instinct, passions are what constitute our moral behaviour. Take for instance the feeling of moral resentment; if a mentally disabled person who had seemingly no will of her own was to kill someone I love, it would not make sense for me to assign any moral blame (whether through reason or intuition) but I would probably still have intuitive feelings of moral resentment (Strawson). This feeling of resentment highlights the immorality of the actions committed regardless of their intentions which gives us a much fuller view of ethical theory; if this feeling did not exist, it would diminish the significance of striving for morality as a whole. Intuition may be subjective and untrustworthy but without it we would not be able to steer our reason in the right directions. If our faculty of reason told us to declare war, our intuitions could still recognize the immorality of the situation; however, declaring a war based on intuition alone is obviously dangerous and even counter-intuitive. This sets up the notion that the more significant our actions are (however significance is defined -more people involved, how long it lasts etc.), the more we are inclined to use reason to justify our actions, yet, at the same time, intuitions have some sort of innate power to overrule the findings of reason. A good analogy would be that of a courtroom within the mind, where if lawyers were to be represented as reasons, who debate for moral truth, while the judge can be represented as our intuition, who gives the final verdict on a moral action. A good lawyer can sometimes change the judges mind (as with economic theory or the flat earth mentioned above) which sets the precedent for any future court cases (i.e. moral cases) but the judge always has the power to overrule decisions (as with moral resentment and attempts to justify immoralities with reason - war). In addition, reason is much slower method when compared to Intuition, which helps in cases of emergency where there is no time to think (e.g. nobody stops to think whether it is moral to save a drowning child in front of them, they just act immediately through intuition).
In conclusion, it is not useful to use reason and intuition exclusively to help us come up with practical moral answers; both these faculties exist within us so that we may use them to deal with the world. Where one faculty may have a limited explanation, the other faculty can fill the void; when we cannot find valid reasons, we will use our intuitions while when our intuitions disagree, we find the answer through rational debate. These two faculties have been created, through evolution, to assist us in our never-ending endeavour to retain our values and strive for survival. It is just as dangerous to use reason alone, where one can come up with an excellent argument to prove an immoral action as moral, as it is to use intuition alone, where our intuitions can lead us to act inconsistently or irrationally. Throughout this essay, we have gone through the relationships between reason and intuition, compared and contrasted their methods and came up with the conclusion that these two faculties must both be used at their full capabilities to have any hope in finding moral truth.
Works Cited
Ariely, Dan, George Loewenstein, Niklas Karlsson, and Uri Simonsohn. "The tree of experience in the forest of information: Overweighing experienced relative to observed information."
Bergson, Henri. The Creative Mind An Introduction to Metaphysics. New York: Replica Books, 1999.
Brosnan, Sarah F., and Frans B.M. De Waal. "Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay." Nature (2003)..
Hume, David. Treatise of Human Nature. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1984.
Korsgaard, Chris. "Normativity, Necessity, and the Synthetic a priori: A Response to Derek Parfit." Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts..
Rand, Ayn. Atlas Shrugged. New York: Plume, 1999.
Strawson, P. F. "Freedom and Resentment."
Before we begin our deliberation, it would be best to outline the matter in which reason and intuition are not necessarily at odds. We can witness how human beings do not morally blame those who lack a ‘fully functional faculty of reason’ (hereby known as F.R.) - (e.g. the elderly, the mentally disabled, children, animals etc.). If one cannot reason, one cannot come up with rational procedures for solving practical moral problems. Therefore, moral blame cannot be assigned to those who are incapable of reasoning (e.g. we do not prosecute children and adults in the same court). Furthermore, nobody expects a person who is lacking a F.R. to have the right intuitions when facing a practical moral problem (e.g. where one expects a person with a F.R. to intuitively want to save a child from drowning in a small pool in front of them by simply picking them up, one does not expect a person who lacks a F.R. - e.g. mentally disabled, elderly, etc. - to have this same intuition), meaning that individuals who lack having a F.R. also lack having a fully functional faculty of intuition (hereby known as F.I.). This points to the notion that intuition and reason are not really mutually exclusive and that their conflict is not necessarily a dichotomy. This also helps answer why there is a common likelihood for intuition and reason to agree in so many cases and how two people may arrive at the same conclusion when one believes he has done it intuitively while the other believes he has done it rationally. To further the explanation of the above claim, we can observe that the quality of the faculties of reason and intuition are a matter of degree, just as it is with moral blameworthiness (e.g. we assign a higher degree of moral blame on a 10 year old then a 5 year old). Many factors can vary these degrees including the developing phases of human growth, the severity of a mental disability and even the progression of an animal’s evolution.
Not only does moral advancement happen throughout human history, but it happens through the history of all creatures, just as there is a biological evolutionary advancement. Empirical evidence shows actions of supposed intuitive ‘moral behaviours’ from all sorts of animals including monkeys, dolphins, buffalos, hippos and dogs - even towards animals of different species. These are animals who may be viewed as having the capability of reaching the last step of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, striving for some sort of self-actualization. Take for instance the monkey protest: when a monkey finds out that another monkey has been given a higher share of a reward for the same amount of work, the monkey protests by going on strike and not continuing his work or doing something else (Brosnan). It is unlikely that the monkey is actually reasoning out some moral notion of equality, rather it is more probable that it is just recognizing the intrinsic wrongness of inequality within that given situation. These intuitive moral behaviours have most likely formed out of an animals primal survival instincts. Human beings not only recognize the unfairness of the situation as monkeys do but also try to build some sort of theory or justification around it so that their community can be steered towards trying to avoid further situations of unfairness because nobody likes being in that position. Comparing the differences between the mental capabilities of human beings and monkeys with their potentiality for intuitive or rationalized morality indicates that reason may be an evolutionary extension or expansion upon intuition instead of something that has been formed independently.
So far, having disassembled the dichotomy and having shown that reason and intuition are more likely to be mutual inclusive than at odds, we are now in a much better position to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each method.
The main power of intuition is triggered by forces of emotion. When one witnesses a brutal murder or rape, the sympathy that is felt for the victim creates a moral sentiment which labels that action as being ‘wrong’. This labelling process requires no method of reasoning, rather, it is powered by our emotional faculties. The significance of reason is then devalued since it is not necessarily needed to make moral judgments (Hume 84).
Here we are left with the problem of trying to prove and regain the significance of reason; for this, it would seem necessary to integrate facts and values, otherwise known as deriving an ought from an is. The supposition is that, if we were to look at the real world, we would find nothing that tells us how we ought to act (e.g. a rock that is falling down a cliff does not have a destination in which it ‘ought’ to land) - (Hume 1.1.27). However, we can see that values are only important to living things (i.e. dead people do not have any values) meaning that value only exists because life exists. To keep these values, living things ought to try to survive and this need for survival also becomes of value (Rand 923). If one does not have any values, one is only capable of feeling pain (e.g. if one does not value survival, one may not value food meaning that they can only starve to death). Morality then, comes out of the value one has to survive and can be in the form of intuition or reason; just as the monkey who would rather do something else than work for unequal pay because her work is less valued (explained above). Through evolution, human beings have developed and expanded their faculty of intuition with a faculty of reason, which is more precise, universal and more objective, to help assist them with survival while other animals have found other ways to help them survive and keep hold of their values (i.e. intuition and reason are faculties which help us survive and survival is necessary for the existence of value). Much like intuition and reason, facts and values may also be mutually inclusive.
Another positive feature of Intuition is its ability to, if someone was to somehow justify the permissibility of an immoral act (e.g. rape) through reason, immediately disagree and stump the new proposal from reason. However there are cases where reason has the ability to change intuitive notions. For example, before Columbus sailed to the new world, it was intuitively true that the world was flat. Yet, through the reasoning developed by the ancient worlds, intuition changed from a flat earth to an earth that is shaped more like the moon. A more modern example can be extracted out of the field of economics. In economics, various actions that are deemed to be right are necessarily counter-intuitive - but only counter-intuitive for those who have not studied economics. Even basic capitalistic ideals are counter-intuitive such as the efficiency of a spontaneous and decentralized order.
Now I would like to address the risk involved when using intuition to come up with moral judgments. The biggest problem intuition has to face is itself; two people can have two different views on what is intuitively correct. Also, intuitions are likely to change depending on certain circumstances. In the trolley case, where one must decide to save five people by killing one, people have different conclusions as to what actions they would take depending on various factors (e.g. whether they are actively doing it - flicking a switch versus pushing someone in the way of the trolley) even when these factors do not alter the result. Through this, we have recognized that human beings have different reasons and intuitions on what they should value (e.g. consequences, intentions, etc.). Another example is the case of abortion, where one person may intuitively think that killing an innocent person is wrong and the other may intuitively think that taking away a person’s right to choose is wrong - this is an argument that may arise from the different intuitions people have on what a person actually is. Furthermore, it is normal for intuitions to change depending on emotion. One study shows that people are more likely to cheat and steal when someone from their own group cheats and steals and people are less likely to cheat and steal when someone in another group cheats and steals. Intuitions actually change depending on ‘group think’ pointing to the notion that intuitions are culturally/collectively relative. In the same study, it was found that it is more likely for more people to cheat a little rather than for some people to cheat a lot. The theory is that people like to think of themselves as being ‘good’ so if someone from their own group does something wrong, they are more inclined to do it because they recognize that person as being apart of them (and vice versa when they are not apart of their group). In the same way, stealing a lot is viewed to be ‘bad’ while stealing a little is viewed to be trivial so more people are inclined to do trivial bad actions so they would not think of themselves as being ‘bad’ (Ariely). This is why intuitions of good and bad vary depending on their feelings at the time. As a result, we can see that conflicting moralities for certain dilemmas cannot be solved using intuition alone as they rely solely on emotional experience; alternatively, rationality has a much better method to resolve disputes and relativity, using an objective method of science and logic. In fact, it makes intuitive sense for us to use rationality to debate controversial issues rather than use arguments from intuition or emotion as there is no way to prove one person’s emotion to be ‘more right‘ than another. We intuitively want to find a true answer (an answer where there can be no dispute) so our intuition actually tells us to use reason. Only rationality can bring us closer to truth as what it tries to find is testable, evident and universal. Truth, whether or not it exists, becomes increasingly valuable, as there are less controversies to debate, the closer we get to it. An act should be deemed right because of the right reasons - as their validity can be debated - not because of some preconceived intuitions of what the property of rightness holds (Korsgaard 3).
Reason, however, cannot contest intuition on all fronts. Although reason is more trustworthy than intuition, we cannot assume that reason is always the right answer (i.e. it has its limits and truth may not always be reachable). Ultimately, even if our feelings come from some sort of evolutionary survival instinct, passions are what constitute our moral behaviour. Take for instance the feeling of moral resentment; if a mentally disabled person who had seemingly no will of her own was to kill someone I love, it would not make sense for me to assign any moral blame (whether through reason or intuition) but I would probably still have intuitive feelings of moral resentment (Strawson). This feeling of resentment highlights the immorality of the actions committed regardless of their intentions which gives us a much fuller view of ethical theory; if this feeling did not exist, it would diminish the significance of striving for morality as a whole. Intuition may be subjective and untrustworthy but without it we would not be able to steer our reason in the right directions. If our faculty of reason told us to declare war, our intuitions could still recognize the immorality of the situation; however, declaring a war based on intuition alone is obviously dangerous and even counter-intuitive. This sets up the notion that the more significant our actions are (however significance is defined -more people involved, how long it lasts etc.), the more we are inclined to use reason to justify our actions, yet, at the same time, intuitions have some sort of innate power to overrule the findings of reason. A good analogy would be that of a courtroom within the mind, where if lawyers were to be represented as reasons, who debate for moral truth, while the judge can be represented as our intuition, who gives the final verdict on a moral action. A good lawyer can sometimes change the judges mind (as with economic theory or the flat earth mentioned above) which sets the precedent for any future court cases (i.e. moral cases) but the judge always has the power to overrule decisions (as with moral resentment and attempts to justify immoralities with reason - war). In addition, reason is much slower method when compared to Intuition, which helps in cases of emergency where there is no time to think (e.g. nobody stops to think whether it is moral to save a drowning child in front of them, they just act immediately through intuition).
In conclusion, it is not useful to use reason and intuition exclusively to help us come up with practical moral answers; both these faculties exist within us so that we may use them to deal with the world. Where one faculty may have a limited explanation, the other faculty can fill the void; when we cannot find valid reasons, we will use our intuitions while when our intuitions disagree, we find the answer through rational debate. These two faculties have been created, through evolution, to assist us in our never-ending endeavour to retain our values and strive for survival. It is just as dangerous to use reason alone, where one can come up with an excellent argument to prove an immoral action as moral, as it is to use intuition alone, where our intuitions can lead us to act inconsistently or irrationally. Throughout this essay, we have gone through the relationships between reason and intuition, compared and contrasted their methods and came up with the conclusion that these two faculties must both be used at their full capabilities to have any hope in finding moral truth.
Works Cited
Ariely, Dan, George Loewenstein, Niklas Karlsson, and Uri Simonsohn. "The tree of experience in the forest of information: Overweighing experienced relative to observed information."
Bergson, Henri. The Creative Mind An Introduction to Metaphysics. New York: Replica Books, 1999.
Brosnan, Sarah F., and Frans B.M. De Waal. "Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay." Nature (2003).
Hume, David. Treatise of Human Nature. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1984.
Korsgaard, Chris. "Normativity, Necessity, and the Synthetic a priori: A Response to Derek Parfit." Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Rand, Ayn. Atlas Shrugged. New York: Plume, 1999.
Strawson, P. F. "Freedom and Resentment."
Saturday, April 4, 2009
8 Person Monopoly
I was playing monopoly with 7 people... we soon found out how hard it was to gain any sort of monopoly, even when one of us held 7 properties.
We were going to create cartels... but we disbanded instead.
We were going to create cartels... but we disbanded instead.
Thursday, April 2, 2009
Solving the problem with the problem
Religion is to solve ignorance with ignorance.
Statism is to solve violence with violence.
Statism is to solve violence with violence.
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
Rejecting Science
To reject science is to reject skepticism.
That is, it is to be skeptical of skepticism.
That is, it is to be skeptical of skepticism.
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
Intellectuals and Politicians
the only people i dont like to be around are people who think they know better than other people. intellectuals.
university is full of them. because of these thoughts, some come to think that they have the authority over other peoples lives. these people usually grow up to be politicians.
even doctors let their patients decide what choices to make, after a simplified explanation.
i twinge when i hear them debate.
university is full of them. because of these thoughts, some come to think that they have the authority over other peoples lives. these people usually grow up to be politicians.
even doctors let their patients decide what choices to make, after a simplified explanation.
i twinge when i hear them debate.
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Peace, War, Pacifism & Violence
Peace and war are not at ends as most people think. They are lumped together, they are two sides of the same coin, they are the yin and yang of society.
Political pacifists are hypocrites. They advocate non-violence but turn around and give your slave owners wages and pay for your 'protection' with your own money.
They free themselves of violence.
Individuals need to control their own violence.
Pacifism is not the answer, it only leads you to delegate your capability to use violence onto someone else.
Hobbes explains, we engage in the creation of a type of social contract in order to survive. As we are trying to avoid the state of war, we group together to keep us safe. Yet, nations are surviving within a state of nature, a state of anarchy. They are always subject to the same state of war, and they, although not perfectly, manage to settle there affairs... well, as best as ever-growing monopolizers can.
Political pacifists are hypocrites. They advocate non-violence but turn around and give your slave owners wages and pay for your 'protection' with your own money.
They free themselves of violence.
Individuals need to control their own violence.
Pacifism is not the answer, it only leads you to delegate your capability to use violence onto someone else.
Hobbes explains, we engage in the creation of a type of social contract in order to survive. As we are trying to avoid the state of war, we group together to keep us safe. Yet, nations are surviving within a state of nature, a state of anarchy. They are always subject to the same state of war, and they, although not perfectly, manage to settle there affairs... well, as best as ever-growing monopolizers can.
Sunday, March 15, 2009
The Humility of Knowing Your Limits
While John Stewart spent his time destroying Jim Cramer, on March 11th, Stephen Colbert miserably tried to do the same with Ayn Rand. In the first segment of his show, he attacked Ayn Rand on the grounds of her endorsement of selfishness, failing to mention 'rational self-interest;' the phrase of less emotional attachment. He calls it the 'conservative bible' and, in the description box beside him, 'preachy and can be used to justify anything.'
"Just another example of the little guy trying to keep the man down."
- Stephen Colbert
However, in his second segment, Colbert fails to see the inconsistency of his attack on Rand which shines through his liberalism. First, he calls out Howard Fineman's book, The Thirteen American Arguments, on its real purpose, to 'make some scratch' rather than 'to say that there's history in the headlines and headlines in history.' He then calls him a member of the media elite and asks him,
"Isn't one of the big American arguments, is why do guys like you get to decide what the arguments are, for people like us?"
- Stephen Colbert
Fineman agrees with him and backs himself up by listing his credentials. They both go on to attack Rand by talking about the limits of individualism.
"Everybody can't live on the island that Ayn Rand was talking about."
- Howard Fineman
Colbert is then enlightened by his conclusion that, within a debate, while there is a possibility for his opponent to be wrong, there is a possibility that he himself may be wrong as well. Yet, this humility is the same conclusion that Ayn Rand's philosophy and libertarian philosophy in general, leads to. Just as Hayek argues, this is the humility of knowing in ones own limit to knowledge (i.e. understanding the impossibility of omniscience); a truth which modern states seem to ignore when they strive for divinity. This is the same divinity that gives the government the 'moral power' to use violence (Walter Benjamin). The progression of collective knowledge is more productive in the hands of individuals who hold within them, the freedom of association.
If we acknowledge this limitation while striving for morality, it would not make sense to force our morality on others (i.e. other than specific cases such as self-defense).
The simple fact is that, even in Colbert's field, the government subsidizes the mainstream media. This has huge impacts. The population is subdued to obey, take sides and vote. Government created oligarchies inform the nation by telling people like Colbert what to do.
Then we see Colbert attacking a philosopher who has pointed out the very chains he complains about.
"Just another example of the little guy trying to keep the man down."
- Stephen Colbert
However, in his second segment, Colbert fails to see the inconsistency of his attack on Rand which shines through his liberalism. First, he calls out Howard Fineman's book, The Thirteen American Arguments, on its real purpose, to 'make some scratch' rather than 'to say that there's history in the headlines and headlines in history.' He then calls him a member of the media elite and asks him,
"Isn't one of the big American arguments, is why do guys like you get to decide what the arguments are, for people like us?"
- Stephen Colbert
Fineman agrees with him and backs himself up by listing his credentials. They both go on to attack Rand by talking about the limits of individualism.
"Everybody can't live on the island that Ayn Rand was talking about."
- Howard Fineman
Colbert is then enlightened by his conclusion that, within a debate, while there is a possibility for his opponent to be wrong, there is a possibility that he himself may be wrong as well. Yet, this humility is the same conclusion that Ayn Rand's philosophy and libertarian philosophy in general, leads to. Just as Hayek argues, this is the humility of knowing in ones own limit to knowledge (i.e. understanding the impossibility of omniscience); a truth which modern states seem to ignore when they strive for divinity. This is the same divinity that gives the government the 'moral power' to use violence (Walter Benjamin). The progression of collective knowledge is more productive in the hands of individuals who hold within them, the freedom of association.
If we acknowledge this limitation while striving for morality, it would not make sense to force our morality on others (i.e. other than specific cases such as self-defense).
The simple fact is that, even in Colbert's field, the government subsidizes the mainstream media. This has huge impacts. The population is subdued to obey, take sides and vote. Government created oligarchies inform the nation by telling people like Colbert what to do.
Then we see Colbert attacking a philosopher who has pointed out the very chains he complains about.
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
On Anarchy
If anarchy does indeed incur, those who believe in socialism will do so of their own accord. Of course, you cannot force people to do the same as there will be defensive resistance. If one believes in the success of socialism (or communism, and the like), one would then too need to believe that this system would work through voluntary measures. Voluntary groups, communes/insurance companies etc., would take over and one would choose their own services without necessarily having to move.
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